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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
This case presents the question of whether the 
 3 
Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act (―Steel Act‖), 
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1881-1887, is unconstitutional insofar as 
it prohibits the use of temporary bridges made out of foreign 
steel on public works projects.  Appellant Mabey Bridge & 
Shore, Inc. (―Mabey‖) appeals the District Court‘s grant of 
summary judgment on its claim that the Steel Act (and the 
Department of Transportation‘s interpretation thereof) is 
preempted by the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. § 313, as well 
as on its claims that the Steel Act violates the Commerce 
Clause, Contract Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.  We will affirm.   
 
I. 
In 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted 
the Steel Act, which requires that steel products used or 
supplied in the performance of a public works contract must 
be made in the United States.  In particular, the Act provides:  
    
Every public agency shall require that every 
contract document for the construction, 
reconstruction, alteration, repair, improvement 
or maintenance of public works contain a 
provision that, if any steel products are to be 
used or supplied in the performance of the 
contract, only steel products as herein defined 
shall be used or supplied in the performance of 
the contract or any subcontracts thereunder. 
 
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1884(a).  The Act defines the term ―steel 
products‖ as ―[p]roducts rolled, formed, shaped, drawn, 
extruded, forged, cast, fabricated or otherwise similarly 
processed . . . from steel made in the United States.‖  Id. § 
1886 (emphasis supplied).  ―Public works‖ is defined, in 
relevant part, as ―[a]ny structure, . . . bridge, . . . or other 
betterment, work or improvement whether of a permanent or 
temporary nature and whether for governmental or proprietary 
use.‖  Id.   
 
The only statutory exception to the Act‘s requirement 
of steel made in the United States is where the ―head of the 
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public agency, in writing, determines that steel products as 
herein defined are not produced in the United States in 
sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the contract.‖  
Id. § 1884(b).  A Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
(―PennDOT‖) publication provides an additional exception in 
situations where the ―steel products are used as a construction 
tool and will not serve a permanent functional use in the 
project.‖  Pennsylvania Department of Transportation – 
Specifications, Publication 408/2007-6 at § 106.01 (Change 
No. 6, Effective April 2, 2010).   
 
Appellant Mabey is a Delaware corporation engaged in 
the business of supplying temporary steel bridges for 
construction projects.
2
  These bridges are designed to handle 
traffic and pedestrians while a construction project is 
underway.  Mabey‘s bridges are made of steel from the 
United Kingdom.      
 
 Mabey has supplied temporary bridges to contractors 
for use in public works projects, including PennDOT projects, 
for more than 20 years.  Over that time, Mabey estimates that 
it has provided temporary bridges for use on approximately 
fifty PennDOT projects.  Mabey asserts that its bridges have 
always performed to specification, and it provided 
documentation showing PennDOT considered it an ―approved 
temporary bridge fabricator.‖  Not until 2010, however, did 
PennDOT raise the issue of whether Mabey‘s bridges were 
prohibited under the Steel Act.    
  
 In December 2009, Mabey provided a quote for a 
temporary bridge to a contractor for purposes of a bid on a 
PennDOT project.  The contractor‘s bid was accepted and it 
subcontracted with Mabey to provide the bridge.  The bridge 
specifications were submitted to a PennDOT engineer, and 
the engineer approved the bridge for use on the project.  
                                                 
2
 Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to Mabey, the 





On April 29, 2010, however, PennDOT notified the 
contractor that the Steel Act precluded the use of Mabey‘s 
temporary bridge on the project because the bridge is made of 
foreign steel.  The following month, PennDOT‘s Chief Bridge 
Engineer sent an e-mail to all district engineers notifying them 
that foreign steel is not to be used for the construction of 
temporary bridges, and instructing them to review all projects 
that specify the use of a temporary bridge and incorporate a 
―special provision‖ codifying this requirement.   Likewise, on 
June 16, 2010, PennDOT sent a letter to the contractor 
concluding that a temporary bridge (1) is itself a ―public 
work‖ within the meaning of the Steel Act and thus its steel 
components must be manufactured in the United States; and 
(2) does not qualify for the exception for products used as a 
construction tool that will not serve a permanent functional 
use in the project.  The letter concluded that ―[t]he use of the 
Mabey Bridge, to the extent it does not contain steel that is of 
domestic manufacture, seems ruled out by the Act.‖  Because 
of these actions, Mabey claims it has been forced to cancel 
four contracts for temporary bridges on PennDOT projects, 
and prevented from giving quotes to contractors for bids on 
future projects.    
 
 On July 16, 2010, Mabey filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against 
Allen Biehler, Secretary of Transportation for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Mabey sought a declaration 
that the Steel Act, as interpreted and enforced by PennDOT, is 
unconstitutional.  Mabey also requested a preliminary and 
permanent injunction enjoining PennDOT from prohibiting 
the use of Mabey‘s temporary bridges on its projects.  The 
District Court granted the Secretary‘s motion for summary 
judgment on all of Mabey‘s claims.  This appeal followed.     
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district 
court‘s grant of summary judgment, Monroe v. Beard, 536 
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F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008), and will affirm only if ―there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law,‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
We exercise de novo review over the preemption question, 
Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 115 n.20 (3d Cir. 2010), as 
well as over a district court‘s interpretation of the 
Constitution, Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206 
(3d Cir. 2004).  We will address each of Mabey‘s four 
constitutional claims in turn.  
 
A. 
Mabey‘s primary contention on appeal is that the Steel 
Act is preempted by the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. § 313, 
and related federal regulations.   The doctrine of preemption 
is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, which declares that the laws of the United States 
―shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.‖  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Bruesewitz v. 
Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2009).  Courts have 
recognized three different kinds of preemption: express 
preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.  
Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  As we have explained:  
 
Express preemption requires that Congress‘s 
intent to preempt be explicitly stated in the 
statute‘s language or implicitly contained in its 
structure and purpose.  Conflict preemption 
occurs when state law actually conflicts with 
federal law, such that it is impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and 
federal requirements, or where state law stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.  Field preemption occurs when a field 
is reserved for federal regulation, leaving no 
room for state regulation, and congressional 




Id. (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citations 
omitted).  ―In analyzing a potential conflict between federal 
and state law, we must be guided by the rule that the purpose 
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption 
case.‖  Deweese v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 590 F.3d 239, 
246 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal alteration and quotation marks 
omitted).  Furthermore, we ―consider the entire scheme of the 
federal statute and identify its purpose and intended effect.‖3  
Id. (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).  
 
The Buy America Act provides that the Secretary of 
Transportation shall not obligate federal funds for highway 
and transit projects ―unless steel, iron, and manufactured 
products used in such project[s] are produced in the United 
States.‖  23 U.S.C. § 313(a).  In contrast to the Steel Act, the 
Buy America Act provides a more extensive set of exceptions 
to the domestic production requirement, providing that the 
statute‘s provisions do not apply where the Secretary finds: 
―(1) that their application would be inconsistent with the 
public interest; (2) that such materials and products are not 
                                                 
3
 Generally, in analyzing a preemption question, we are guided 
by ―the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to 
displace state law‖—referred to as the ―presumption against 
preemption.‖  Farina, 625 F.3d at 116.  Mabey, however, 
disputes the applicability of the presumption in cases 
involving foreign commerce issues, relying on decisions 
stating that the presumption does not apply when the state law 
touches an area ―where state regulation has traditionally been 
absent,‖ id., or ―when the State regulates in an area where 
there has been a history of significant federal presence,‖ 
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).  We note that 
we have previously applied the presumption in a preemption 
challenge to the Steel Act, albeit on other grounds.  Trojan 
Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that state procurement policy is a field of traditional 
state regulation).  Here, however, we have little difficulty 
concluding the Steel Act is not preempted without the need to 
resort to the presumption.  
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produced in the United States in sufficient and reasonably 
available quantities and of a satisfactory quality; or (3) that 
inclusion of domestic material will increase the cost of the 
overall project contract by more than 25 percent.‖  Id. § 
313(b).  The regulations also provide for a de minimis 
exception to the Act, where the cost of the foreign steel or 
iron materials does not exceed certain benchmarks.  23 C.F.R. 
§ 635.410(b)(4).   
 
Importantly, the regulations also contain a provision 
that indicates that the Buy America requirements are satisfied 
when the project ―[i]ncludes no permanently incorporated 
steel or iron materials.‖  Id. § 635.410(b)(1) (emphasis 
supplied).  From this provision, Mabey contends that, while 
its temporary bridges are prohibited under Pennsylvania‘s 
Steel Act, they are exempted from the domestic steel 
requirements of the federal law because they are not 
permanently incorporated in the underlying project.
4
  Mabey 
argues that the Buy America Act‘s ―tempered and limited 
application‖ of the domestic steel requirement, including its 
exception for temporary steel items, preempts the Steel Act‘s 
more restrictive requirements.  Thus, the relevant question 
before us is whether the federal law provides only a ―floor‖—
minimum requirements which the states are free to exceed if 
they wish—or whether the federal standards are intended to 
be uniform throughout the country, invalidating more 
restrictive state requirements.   
 
                                                 
4
 Mabey‘s position that its temporary bridges would be 
exempted from the application of Buy America Act under this 
provision finds support in certain Federal Highway 
Administration documents.  See FHWA Contract 
Administration Core Curriculum Participant‘s Manual and 
Reference Guide 2006 at 59 (stating that, ―[f]or the Buy 
America requirements to apply, the steel or iron products must 
be permanently incorporated into the project.  Buy America 
does not apply to temporary steel items, e.g., . . . temporary 
bridges‖).  For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume, 
without deciding, that Mabey‘s bridges would be permissible 
under the Buy America Act.     
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We conclude that the Buy America Act demonstrates 
Congress‘s intent to allow states to enact more restrictive 
requirements related to the use of domestic steel and, thus, 
that the Steel Act is not preempted.  In the same section that 
contains the domestic steel requirement, the Buy America Act 
also states:        
   
The Secretary of Transportation shall not 
impose any limitation or condition on assistance 
provided under the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 2097) or this 
title that restricts any State from imposing more 
stringent requirements than this section on the 
use of articles, materials, and supplies mined, 
produced, or manufactured in foreign countries 
in projects carried out with such assistance or 
restricts any recipient of such assistance from 
complying with such State imposed 
requirements. 
 
23 U.S.C. § 313(d) (emphasis supplied).  Mabey argues that 
this section is inapplicable because ―it is only a restriction on 
the power of the Secretary of Transportation, not an 
affirmative grant of power to the states.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 
32.  This argument, however, misses the point.  The 
touchstone of the preemption analysis is whether Congress 
intended to displace state law.  The statutory language, far 
from demonstrating an intent to preempt state law, instead 
demonstrates that Congress was aware that individual states 
may have ―more stringent requirements‖ than the Buy 
America Act, and specifically instructed the Secretary of 
Transportation not to interfere with those requirements.  Such 
an instruction is tantamount to congressional authorization for 
more stringent state practices to continue.  Under such 
circumstances, there can be no preemption.  See Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574-75 (2009) (noting that the case for 
federal preemption is particularly weak where Congress has 
demonstrated awareness of the operation of state law but has 
not acted).       
 
 Mabey seeks to avoid the language of 23 U.S.C. § 
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313(d) by instead relying principally on the federal 
regulations implementing the Buy America Act, particularly 
23 C.F.R. § 635.409(b).  That section provides that:  
 
No requirement shall be imposed and no 
procedure shall be enforced by any State 
transportation department in connection with a 
project which may operate: . . . (b) To prohibit, 
restrict or otherwise discriminate against the 
use of articles or materials of foreign origin to 
any greater extent than is permissible under 
policies of the Department of Transportation as 
evidenced by requirements and procedures 
prescribed by the FHWA Administrator to carry 
out such policies. 
 
23 CFR § 635.409(b) (emphasis supplied).  Mabey argues that 
this provision shows that federal law ―clearly prohibits states 
from imposing Buy America requirements that are 
inconsistent with federal policy, including the policy of 
expressly exempting temporary bridges from the domestic 
steel requirements.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 33.   
 
 Mabey correctly points out that ―an agency regulation 
with the force of law can pre-empt conflicting state 
requirements.‖  Levine, 555 U.S. at 576.  We are skeptical, 
however, as to whether a regulation can be used to support 
preemption in contravention of clear statutory language 
demonstrating Congress‘s intent not to preempt state law, 
such as that found in § 313(d).  In any case, we find Mabey‘s 
reliance on the regulations unavailing.       
 
Whatever support § 635.409(b), standing alone, may 
provide for Mabey‘s argument, we cannot view that 
regulation in isolation but, rather, must examine how it fits 
into the larger regulatory scheme.  Deweese, 590 F.3d at 246 
(a court must examine ―the entire scheme‖ of the federal law 
at issue).  Of particular importance here is another regulation 
in the same subpart, 23 C.F.R. § 635.410, entitled ―Buy 
America requirements.‖  That regulation provides:   
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 (b) No Federal-aid highway construction 
project is to be authorized for advertisement or 
otherwise authorized to proceed unless at least 
one of the following requirements is met: 
 
(1) The project either: (i) Includes no 
permanently incorporated steel or iron 
materials, or (ii) if steel or iron materials are to 
be used, all manufacturing processes . . . for 
these materials must occur in the United States. 
. . . [or;]   
 
(2) The State has standard contract 
provisions that require the use of domestic 
materials and products, including steel and iron 
materials, to the same or greater extent as the 
provisions set forth in this section.  
 
Id. § 635.410(b)(1)–(2) (emphasis supplied).  Thus, echoing 
the Buy America statute, § 635.410(b)(2) contemplates that 
states may have more stringent requirements regarding the use 
of domestic steel materials than the federal law, and explicitly 
allows these more stringent requirements to satisfy the federal 
Buy America requirements.         
 
 We need not decide whether §§ 635.409(b) and 
635.410(b)(2) conflict, or how they operate together in 
practice.  To the extent there is any conflict between the two, 
§ 635.410 explicitly provides that ―[t]he provisions of this 
section shall prevail and be given precedence over any 
requirements of this subpart which are contrary to this 
section,‖ thus trumping the operation of § 635.409(b) relied 
upon by Mabey.   Id. § 635.410(a).  Even without the express 
precedence of § 635.410, we note that the two regulations 
read in conjunction could, at best, be said to be ambiguous on 
the issue of more restrictive state requirements.  An 
ambiguous regulatory scheme, however, cannot demonstrate 
the clear congressional intent necessary to establish 
preemption of state law.   
 
In sum, we conclude that the Buy America Act, 
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together with 23 C.F.R. § 635.410(b)(2), demonstrate a 
federal legislative and regulatory scheme that takes into 
account concurrent state legislation in this area, and 
authorizes the states to impose more stringent requirements on 
the domestic manufacture of steel products.  Congress neither 
expressly preempted state law, nor exclusively occupied the 
field of regulation of domestic steel requirements in public 
works projects.  Furthermore, because Congress contemplated 
more restrictive state regulations, we cannot conclude that 
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
congressional objectives.  The Steel Act is, therefore, not 
preempted by federal law.   
      
B. 
 Mabey argues, next, that the Steel Act is 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.  The 
Commerce Clause ―grants Congress plenary authority to 
regulate commerce among the states, and ‗has long been 
understood to have a ‗negative‘ aspect that denies the States 
the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the 
interstate flow of articles of commerce.‘‖  Tri-M Group, LLC 
v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 418 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Oregon 
Waste Sys., Inc. v, Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 
(1994)).  A state regulation that discriminates against 
interstate commerce in favor of local business or investment 
is per se invalid, unless it survives rigorous scrutiny.  
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 
298 F.3d 201, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2002).  Where, as here, a state 
law touches on ―‗the unique context of foreign commerce,‘ 
[the] State‘s power is further constrained because of ‗the 
special need for federal uniformity.‘‖  Barclays Bank PLC v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 311 (1994) (quoting 
Wardair Can. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).  
A state law is immune from attack under the Commerce 
Clause, however, if certain exceptions apply, including where 
the state is acting as a ―market participant‖ rather than a 
market regulator, or where Congress ―authorize[s] states to 
impose restrictions that the dormant Commerce Clause would 
otherwise forbid.‖  Tri-M Group, 638 F.3d at 418, 430.  
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 Mabey argues that neither exception to the Commerce 
Clause applies in this case, and that the Steel Act cannot 
withstand the heightened scrutiny that applies to laws that 
facially discriminate against foreign commerce.  In particular, 
Mabey argues that Congress has not clearly authorized the 
states to discriminate against foreign steel, and that the market 
participant doctrine is wholly inapplicable in the context of 
foreign commerce.  Mabey also argues that, even if the 
market participant exception is available, PennDOT acts as a 
market regulator, not a participant, in implementing the Steel 
Act.   
1. 
In analyzing Mabey‘s claim under the Commerce 
Clause, we do not write on a clean slate; indeed, we 
previously addressed a Commerce Clause challenge to the 
Steel Act in Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 
(3d Cir. 1990).  In Trojan, appellant Trojan Technologies was 
a Canadian corporation that manufactured and supplied 
ultraviolet light water disinfection systems, which contained 
various steel parts.  These devices were sold to municipalities 
and authorities for use in public works projects such as waste 
water and sewage treatment facilities.  The Pennsylvania 
Attorney General, however, sought documentation from the 
company that the devices complied with the Steel Act.  Trojan 
responded by filing suit claiming the Act was 
unconstitutional, in part because it burdened foreign 
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.     
 
On appeal, we agreed with the district court that the 
Steel Act did not violate the Commerce Clause.  We began by 
noting that the Supreme Court had ―expressly reserved the 
question of whether state buy-American statutes that affect 
foreign commerce violate the commerce clause, or are 
permissible under the market participant doctrine or on other 
grounds.‖  Id. at 910 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 
429, 437 n.9 (1980)).  We independently concluded, however, 
that the ―market-participant‖ exception to the Commerce 
Clause did apply to the Steel Act, stating: ―we are convinced 
that with respect to state buy-American statutes there can be 
no commerce clause intrusion even in a foreign commerce 
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context where there is no attempt to regulate.‖  Id.  We 
rejected an argument that the exception did not apply to the 
Steel Act because the disinfection systems were purchased by 
municipalities, rather than directly by the Commonwealth 
itself.  Relying on the Supreme Court‘s decision in White v. 
Massachusetts Council of Construction  Employers, Inc., 460 
U.S. 204 (1983), we found it immaterial that the 
Commonwealth was not in formal privity of contract with the 
suppliers.  Rather, we held that, ―[a]s the ultimately 
controlling public purchaser, the Commonwealth enjoys the 
same right to specify to its suppliers the source of steel to be 
used in any supplies provided as is enjoyed by similarly 
situated private purchasers.‖  Trojan, 916 F.2d at 911.  
Finally, we acknowledged that statutes affecting foreign 
commerce are subject to more searching review.  
Nevertheless, we concluded that the Steel Act ―survives even 
the most searching review,‖ noting that the Act does not 
implicate the concerns of multiple taxation or impairment of 
federal uniformity that apply to state statutes affecting foreign 
commerce.  Id. at 912.  
 
 Trojan is directly on-point and forecloses Mabey‘s 
claim under the Commerce Clause.  Moreover, Mabey‘s 
attempts to distinguish Trojan are unpersuasive.  First, 
Mabey‘s argument that Trojan did not involve the federal Buy 
America Act is irrelevant for the purposes of the market 
participant analysis.  Second, the fact that Trojan involved 
ultraviolet water disinfection devices installed at water and 
sewage treatment facilities, while this case involves 
temporary bridges for road projects, is likewise immaterial.  
Mabey contends that Pennsylvania builds and repairs roads 
―in its sovereign capacity and in the exercise of its statutory 
authority,‖ making it a market regulator under the facts of this 
case, not a market participant.  Appellant‘s Br. at 40.  But 
Mabey provides no persuasive reason why the state‘s exercise 
of its authority regarding roads should be treated any 
differently than its exercise of authority regarding water and 
sewage treatment facilities and waste management.  Finally, 
Mabey argues that PennDOT acts as a market regulator 
because it can enforce the Steel Act with powers that are 
unavailable to private actors, such as disgorgement 
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proceedings and debarment from public contracts.  In Trojan, 
however, we explicitly cited to those same statutory powers 
yet still found that the Commonwealth acted as a market 
participant.  See Trojan, 916 F.2d at 905 (citing 73 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1885 and noting that payments made in violation of the 
Act are recoverable directly from the contractor or supplier 
who did not comply and that willful violators are barred from 
bidding on public contracts for 5 years).   
 
2. 
Even if we were not constrained by Trojan, Mabey‘s 
Commerce Clause claim would fail because the Steel Act is 
subject to the congressional authorization exception.  ―‗When 
Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes 
are invulnerable to constitutional attack‘ since Congress‘s 
commerce power in such instances is ‗not dormant, but has 
been exercised by that body.‘‖  Tri-M Group, 638 F.3d at 430 
(quoting Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Gov’rs of Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985)); see also Norfolk S. Corp. v. 
Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392-93 (3d Cir. 1987) (―One defense to 
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge is Congressional 
consent.  By its actions, Congress may . . . permit[] the states 
to regulate the commerce in a manner which would otherwise 
not be permissible.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).5   
                                                 
5
 Mabey points out that, in order to invoke this exception, a 
state typically must prove congressional authorization that is 
―unmistakably clear.‖  Tri-M Group, 638 F.3d at 430.  The 
Supreme Court has stated, however, that in the case of foreign 
commerce, ―unmistakable clarity‖ is not required.  See 
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (―Congress may more 
passively indicate that certain state actions do not impair 
federal uniformity [in foreign commerce] . . . it need not 
convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to 
permit state regulation that discriminates against interstate 
commerce . . . .‖).  Instead, it may be enough where the 
federal government ―has at least acquiesced‖ to the state 
activity in question.  See Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12.  In this 
case, however, the question of the precise standard to apply is 
immaterial given that the congressional authorization here is 
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We conclude that Congress has plainly authorized 
restrictions of the kind contained in the Steel Act.  As noted in 
the discussion of preemption, supra, 23 U.S.C. § 313(d) 
shows that Congress was aware that state laws imposed more 
stringent requirements on the use of foreign materials and 
specifically commanded the Secretary of Transportation not to 
restrict any state from imposing more stringent requirements.  
Likewise, 23 C.F.R. § 635.410(b) allows a state to exceed the 
federal baseline for the use of domestic steel by ―requir[ing] 
the use of domestic materials and products, including steel 
and iron materials, to the same or greater extent as the 
provisions set forth in this section.‖  These provisions show 
the type of unequivocal congressional authorization needed to 
avoid Commerce Clause scrutiny.  The District Court 
correctly granted summary judgment against Mabey on its 
Commerce Clause claim.   
 
C. 
 Mabey next contends that PennDOT‘s actions violated 
the Contract Clause, which provides that ―[n]o State shall . . . 
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.‖  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.  In order to prove a violation of 
this constitutional provision, Mabey must demonstrate that a 
―change in state law has ‗operated as a substantial impairment 
of a contractual relationship.‘‖  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 
503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. 
v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)).  ―This inquiry has 
three components: whether there is a contractual relationship, 
whether a change in law impairs that contractual relationship, 
and whether the impairment is substantial.‖  Id.  Thus, under 
the Contract Clause, the contract in question must preexist the 
passage of the state law.  See id.; see also Fabri v. United 
Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (―The 
Contract Clause prohibits the impairment by the state of 
existing contracts. . . . [T]he statute must have been passed 
after the contract was executed.‖).  Only if these elements are 
met do we ―further inquire whether the law at issue has a 
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legitimate and important public purpose and whether the 
adjustment of the rights of the parties to the contractual 
relationship was reasonable and appropriate in light of that 
purpose.‖  Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 290 v. 
SEPTA, 145 F.3d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 
 We agree with the District Court that Mabey has failed 
to show a ―change in state law‖ that impaired its contracts.  
The Steel Act was enacted in 1978 and was in effect at the 
time Mabey entered into its contracts to provide temporary 
bridges for PennDOT projects.  Thus, even Mabey concedes 
that the passage of the statute itself cannot be the ―change in 
law‖ that impaired Mabey‘s existing contracts.  Rather, 
Mabey argues that ―PennDOT‘s change in its interpretation of 
[the Steel Act] meets the purposes behind the requirement of a 
change in state ‗law.‘‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 54.   
 
 The Supreme Court has made clear that the language 
of the Contract Clause (i.e., ―pass any . . . law‖) means that 
the clause applies only to exercises of legislative power.  As 
the Court noted in Ross v. Oregon, ―[t]he prohibition is aimed 
at the legislative power of the state, and not at the decisions of 
its courts, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or 
officers, or the doings of corporations or individuals.‖  227 
U.S. 150, 162 (1913) (quoting New Orleans Waterworks Co. 
v. La. Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U.S. 18, 30 (1888)).  The Court has 
cautioned, however, that the application of the Contract 
Clause is not limited solely to formal enactments and statutes 
of the state legislature.  Instead, it ―reach[es] every form in 
which the legislative power of a state is exerted, whether it be 
a constitution, a constitutional amendment, an enactment of 
the legislature, a by-law or ordinance of a municipal 
corporation, or a regulation or order of some other 
instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative 
authority.‖  Id. at 162-63.  
 
There is no simple formula for determining whether a 
government act is an exercise of legislative authority.  In 
Ross, however, the Supreme Court provided some guidance to 
courts for purposes of making that determination.  In 
particular, the Court stated that an act bears the hallmarks of 
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legislative authority when it ―changes existing conditions by 
making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part 
of those subject to its power.‖  Id. at 163.  In contrast, an act 
is likely not legislative when ―its purpose was not to prescribe 
a new law for the future, but only to apply to a completed 
transaction laws which were in force at the time.‖  Id.  Thus, 
there is no violation of the Contract Clause when the act in 
question ―investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as 
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed 
already to exist.‖  Id.  Although Ross was decided in a much 
earlier time, and the line between legislative and non-
legislative acts has arguably blurred since that time, the 
guidance provided by that case remains helpful in analyzing 
the legislative character of exercises of state power.    
 
We are troubled by the fact, and fact it appears to be, 
that because PennDOT and Mabey had a long course of 
dealing, Mabey could justifiably believe that its bridges made 
with foreign steel were acceptable.  Nevertheless, in light of 
Ross, we conclude that PennDOT‘s actions were not an 
exercise of legislative authority.  Although those actions had 
great consequences for Mabey, PennDOT‘s decision 
regarding temporary bridges was not truly a ―new rule.‖  
Rather, at least since 1978, the applicable ―rule‖ is, and has 
been, the Steel Act.  PennDOT‘s actions are better 
characterized as interpretive.  PennDOT was not exercising its 
authority to create regulations.  It did not engage in formal, 
notice-and-comment rule making.  Instead, PennDOT, in the 
words of Ross, simply ―declare[d], and enforce[d] liabilities 
as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed 
already to exist.‖  Id.  Indeed, PennDOT‘s written action letter 
discussing the issue of Mabey‘s bridges clearly indicates that 
it was applying and interpreting the rule set forth in the Steel 
Act: 
 
A temporary bridge is explicitly included in the 
[Steel] Act‘s definition of ‗public works.‘  
(Section 6 of the Act, 73 P.S. § 1886, defines 
‗public works‘ as ‗any structure, building, 
highway, waterway, street, bridge, transit 
system, airport, or other betterment, work or 
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improvement whether of a permanent or 
temporary nature . . . .‘ (Emphasis added).)  
The temporary bridge . . . is; therefore, not 
merely a tool used in the construction of a 
‗public work‘ (i.e., the permanent replacement 
bridge), but it is a ‗public work‘ in its own right. 
. . . All steel products used in the construction of 
either bridge must, under the Act, be 
manufactured from steel made in the U.S. . . . 
The use of the Mabey Bridge, to the extent it 
does not contain steel that is of domestic 
manufacture, seems ruled out by the Act.  
 
(JA 73-74.)   
The fact that PennDOT‘s application of the Steel Act 
in 2010 reversed or contradicted its previous interpretation of 
the Act is insufficient.  The Supreme Court has rejected the 
argument that the Contract Clause is violated when there is a 
new interpretation of an antecedent state statute.  See Fleming 
v. Fleming, 264 U.S. 29, 30-32 (1924) (finding no Contract 
Clause violation based on the alleged reversal in interpretation 
of an Iowa state statute, even where the party had relied on 
the earlier interpretation, and holding that a ―statute in force 
when a contract was made cannot be made a subsequent 
statute through new interpretation by the courts‖ (citing Tidal 
Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924))); Stockholders of 
Peoples Banking Co. v. Sterling, 300 U.S. 175, 182 (1937) 
(―Change by judicial construction of antecedent legislation 
does not impair a contract, at least in the forbidden sense, if it 
be granted arguendo that such a change can be discovered.‖).  
Because PennDOT‘s actions interpreted and applied a law 
that had been in force for over 30 years, it did not exercise 
legislative authority subject to scrutiny under the Contract 
Clause.  The District Court thus properly granted summary 
judgment on the Contract Clause claim. 
 
D. 
 Mabey‘s final claim is that PennDOT‘s application of 
the Steel Act violates the Equal Protection Clause.  Mabey‘s 
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argument is two-fold.  Based on Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985), Mabey argues that 
discriminating against out-of-state business does not serve a 
legitimate state purpose.  As we noted in Trojan, however, 
Metropolitan Life has been ―sharply limited to its facts.‖  916 
F.2d at 915 (discussing Ne. Bancorp., 472 U.S. at 180 ).  
Because Trojan considered the Steel Act in the context of 
Metropolitan Life and found ―no basis for concluding that the 
Steel Act contravenes the equal protection clause,‖ Trojan, 
916 F.2d at 915, Mabey‘s argument is unavailing.   
 
Mabey also argues that PennDOT‘s ―distinction 
between temporary bridges and other temporary items is not 
rationally related to a legitimate purpose, in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 58.  In other 
words, Mabey claims that PennDOT impermissibly allows an 
exception to the domestic steel requirement ―for scaffolding, 
construction trailers, or cranes used in PennDOT projects,‖  
id. at 59, but does not allow a similar exception for Mabey‘s 
bridges.   
 
 Because Mabey concedes that the distinction drawn by 
PennDOT does not touch on a suspect class or infringe 
fundamental constitutional rights, it must be upheld ―if there 
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the classification.‖  Alexander v. Whitman, 
114 F.3d 1392, 1407 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach 
Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).  This is a 
―relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court‘s awareness 
that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a 
legislative task and an unavoidable one.‖  Id. at 1407-08 
(quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 
(1976)).  Under rational basis review, a ―statute is presumed 
constitutional . . . and the burden is on the one attacking the 
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis 
which might support it, whether or not the basis has a 
foundation in the record.‖  Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-
21 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
  
 Mabey has not met its heavy burden of overcoming the 
presumption of constitutionality, and surely has not negated 
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every possible justification for the distinction.  Appellee notes 
that temporary bridges are specifically-required items in 
certain PennDOT projects, whereas scaffolding, trailers and 
cranes are items that are used or not at the discretion of the 
contractor.  A state agency could rationally determine that 
application of domestic steel requirements to items used at the 
discretion of the contractor is too onerous and difficult to 
enforce.  Ultimately, the kind of fine distinctions drawn by 
PennDOT with respect to the Steel Act are precisely the kind 
of judgments that the Supreme Court has instructed courts not 
to second-guess.  As the Court has stated: 
 
[R]estraints on judicial review have added force 
where the legislature must necessarily engage in 
a process of line-drawing.  Defining the class of 
persons subject to a regulatory requirement . . . 
inevitably requires that some persons who have 
an almost equally strong claim to favored 
treatment be placed on different sides of the 
line, and the fact [that] the line might have been 
drawn differently at some points is a matter for 
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration. 
 
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315-16 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  In sum, we find no basis for 
concluding that the distinction drawn by PennDOT 
contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.   
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm District 
Court‘s grant of summary judgment.   
 
 
